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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESSSTATUTORY REGULATION OF PRIVATE
OR CONTRACT MOTOR CARRIERS
Within the past decade the motor carrier has risen from
a comparatively insignificant position to an essential and
formidable place in the field of transportation. The widespread and ever growing use of the public highways by
freight and passenger motor carriers for profit has not only
proved destructive of the highways and a menace to the
safety and convenience of the driving public, but has presented new problems of serious economic consequence,
particularly in regard to their position as powerful competitors with the railroads. It has become evident that
besides ordinary road and safety regulations, such as limiting the weight of trucks, requiring licensed drivers, etc.,
which regulations the state unquestionably has the power
to make,' it is economically necessary further to regulate
motor carriers (i.e. regulate their business, as distinguished
from the use of their property) to the end of preserving the
continued existence of the railroads; and, in the case of
contract motor carriers, to protect also the highway common carriers. The power of the state to employ this latter
type of regulation is not so certain, in view of the limitations of the due process clause, and it is with this type of
economic regulation that this note deals.
There is no regulatory difficulty in respect to the common carrier truck or bus. These can of course be constitutionally regulated as to rates, service, and permission to
enter the field, and in most states they are placed under the
'See Rosenbaum 6 Lillienthal, "Motor Carrier Regulation" 26 Col.
Law Rev. 954, 961 (1920). Continental Baking Co .v. Woodring, 286
U. S. 352, (1932); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, 314.
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full supervision of the Public Utility Commission.2

It fol-

lows that the passenger motor carrier for hire presents no
serious problem, for such carriers must, with the exception
of a few particular types of operation, such as the contract
school bus, run on a regular schedule at fixed rates and
serve the public, thereby bringing themselves within the
common carrier category.,3 It is therefore only the private
or contract freight carrier which escapes completely commission control, and it is with the statutory regulation of
this type of carrier, to which recent legislation has been
confined, that this note will deal.,
Although the general principle of law which differentiates the common carrier from the private or contract carrier is easily stated,5 its application to specific operations is
another matter, and the maze of cases which have attempted to place a particular service within the protective cloak
of "private business," or to expose it to the commission
regulations of a common carrier, are conflicting and challenge analysis.6 The fact remains that it is possible for
one to haul for several customers under several individual
247 states and the District of Columbia have common carrier regulatory statutes. See Brown & Scott, infra Note 6, at 568. The Pennsylvania Public Service Co. Law puts common carrirs under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission; 66 P. S., SeL,. i. 3On the Commission regulation of bus operations in Pennsylvania,
see S. G. McNees, "Regulation of Motor Transportation," 37 Dick. L.
R. 81 at 92. (January 1933).
'No attempt will be made here to discuss the question of regulation of carriers engaged in Interstate Commerce. For a discussion of
that problem see McNees, supra Note 3 at 86.
5
"The Private Carrier is one who, without engaging in such business as a public employment, undertakes by special contract to transport goods in particular instances from one place to another. - - - - The
common carrier is one who holds himself out in the exercise of a public
calling, to carry, for hire, for whomsoever may employ him." Dobie,
"Bailments & Carriers." Sec. 106, 107.
0
See Brown & Scott, "Regulation of the Contract Motor Carrier
under the Constitution." 44 Harv. L. R. 530, at 535. (1931). McNees,
supra Note 3.
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contracts and still retain the status of a private carrier.'
Many more motor truck carriers are now engaged in such
contract business than in common carriage and the size and
extent of their business exceed that of the latter. The inevitable result of the unrestricted continuance of this condition will be the extirpation of the common carrier from
the highways and increased rates and poorer service by the
railroads, if not their elimination.
It is true that truck carriers provide more efficient service than the railways in respect to certain common business practices of today which require prompt delivery, 8 but
in the case of long distance bulk hauling the railroad alone
can serve the public. Even as to the beneficial speedy
truck carriage, if the contract carrier is permitted to drive
the common carrier out of business the public will be injured, for there then would be no carriers from whom the
public could demand service at reasonable rates. It is evident that what is needed is a comprehensive regulation of
all these types of carriage, with a view to preserving a correlated transportation system which will best subserve the
interests of the public.
Pressed with this economic need several states passed
statutes providing for regulation of the business of the contract motor carrier and all of them met the fate of being
held unconstitutional9 until the recent Texas Act 10 which
was upheld in Stephenson v. Binford." The importance of
7Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U. S. 256 (1916); Film Transportation Co. v. Michigan P. U. C., 17 Fed. (2nd) 857 (E. D. Mich.
1927); Re Jones, P. U. R. 1924A, 540 (Pa.). This principle is recognized in the cases infra Note 9.
8
For example, many retail merchants today do not keep large stocks
on hand but order only as their business demands. Such a practice requires a speedy delivery usually done by trucks.
9
Michigan P. U. C. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 S. Ct. 191, 36
ALR 1105, (1925), noted in 38 Harv. L. R. 980. Frost v. Railroad

Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 47 ALR 457 (1926), noted in 40 Harv. L.
R. 131.

Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, (1931), noted in 30 Mich. L.

R. 629 (1932).
10Texas General Laws 1931, c. 277.
1153 S. Ct. 181,

(1932).
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this decision is clear, but its real significance and its usefulness as a guide for future legislation can be better understood after a brief review of the prior cases declaring
similar legislative regulation invalid.
The first of these statutes to reach the Supreme Court
was the Michigan statute considered in the Duke case.' 2
This statute provided that all persons engaged in transportation for hire upon the public highways should be common
carriers and that all laws regulating transportation by common carriers should apply with equal effect to them. A
motor freight carrier operating under three contracts assailed the validity of the act as applied to him. The act was
declared unconstitutional, the court employing the following language, "Moreover it is beyond the power of the state
by legislative fiat to convert property used exclusively in
the business of a private carrier into a public utility, for that
would be taking private property for a public use without
just compensation.""
The next important case, Frost v. Railroad Commission," dealt with a California statute 5 which did not declare that all carriers for profit were common carriers, but
required a private carrier to secure a certificate of public
convenience before doing business on the highways. This
was construed by the California Supreme Court's as subjecting the private carrier to all the duties and burdens imposed by the act on common carriers. The United States
Supreme Court accepted this interpretation of the act and
declared it unconstitutional because it, in effect, converted
12Mich. Pub. Acts 1923, No. 209, Mich. P. U. C. v. Duke, supra
Note 9.
Islbid, 45 S. Ct. at 193. This means no more than that the question as to whether a particular business is so affected with a public interest as to be subject to statutory regulation is a question for judicial
determination and not one to be arbitrarily determined by the state legislature; but the "legislative flat" phrase is a potent epithet which the
court often employs with telling effect to exterminate unwise economic
legislation.
14Supra. Note 9.
1sCal. Gen. Laws (Deering 1923) Act 5129, sec. 1 (c).
IsFrost v. Railroad Commission, 197 Cal. 230, 240 Pac. 26, (1925).
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private carriers into common carriers and hence came within the same prohibition as the Duke case. In answer to the
argument that the use of the highways for profit was a privilege which the state could forbid altogetherT and hence
could permit only upon such conditions as it saw fit, the
court applied the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 8
In Smith v. Cahoon. 9 a Florida statute,2 in most respects similar to the California Act, was before the court.
It required a certificate of public convenience from all who
operated motor vehicles for compensation and placed all
obtaining such under the control of the Railroad Commission, with power to regulate rates, service, etc. Here, however, the State Supreme Court held that the act did not require private carriers to become common carriers; that the
provisions of the act were separable; and that only those
regulations which the commission could lawfully apply to
private carriers were intended to apply to them. 21 The
Supreme Court however did not accept this interpretation
and held that no separate scheme of regulation could be
discerned as applicable to each type of carrier and that
therefore the act was invalid as coming within the ban of
the prior two cases. One definite limitation of the state's
17"The streets belong to the public and are primarily for the use of
the public in the ordinary way. Their use for purpose of gain is special
and extraordinary and, generally, at least may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper." Packard v. Banton, 264 U.
S. 140, 144,. 44 S. Ct. 257 (1924).
' 8 This is the doctrine which the court had enunciated in respect to
foreign corporations, to the effect that whereas a state could keep a foreign corporation out altogether it could not permit it to do business in

the state only upon complying with a condition which requires the relinquishment of rights guaranteed by the Constitution; on the ground
that the state could not do indirectly what it could not do directly.
Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall 445, (1874). See Note 79 U.
of P. Law Rev. 1119, 1128 criticizing this doctrine as reflecting on the
logical validity of the general theory of a foreign corporation's status.
The same objection would seem to be true of its application to the
"special privilege" theory of the use of the public highways.
29Supra. Note 9.
20

Fla. Gen. Laws 1929, c. 13700.
21Cahoon v. Smith, 99 Fla. 1174, 128 So. 632, (1930).
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power can be drawn from these cases, viz., a state cannot
require a private carrier to become a common carrier, and
this is true whether the statute expressly states that intention or its operation actually effects that result. It is to be
noted that in none of these cases did the court expressly
hold that the state could not regulate both types of carriers
in the same manner, so long as their regulation was under
separate schemes, nor was there any pronouncement that a
contract motor carrier was not in a business affected with
22
a public interest.
With these statutes and decisions in mind the Texas
legislature drafted an act 2 3 regulating common carriers and

contract freight carriers. It carefully separates the two
types of carriers and has separate provisions applicable to
each. The common carrier must obtain a certificate of
public convenience and the contract carrier must have a
"permit" before engaging in business. The latter is not
to be granted if the Commission is of opinion that the proposed operation will impair the efficient public service of an
authorized common carrier then adequately serving the
same territory. The Commission is also given authority to
fix minimum rates to be charged by the contract carrier,
which rates shall not be less than those prescribed for common carriers for substantially the same kind of service.
There were other regulatory provisions but these two regulations were the only ones vigorously assailed and the only
22

would seem such a holding was implied in the doctrine that the
state could not convert a private carrier into a common carrier, since
this doctrine must have been based on the theory that a private carrier
was not affected with a public interest. However, saying it cannot be
made a common carrier does not necessarily mean that it is not a business affected with a public interest. It might merely mean that it cannot be compelled to serve all; and a business may be affected with a
public interest and subject to rate regulations though it is not under the
obligation to serve all. German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233
U. S. 389, 58 L. Ed. 1011, (1914), and see Powell, "State Utilities and
the Supreme Court", 29 Mich. L. R. 811 (1931).
23Texas Gen. Laws, 1931, c. 277.
1t
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two considered by the court.2 4 The act also declared contract carriage to be a business affected with a public interest and contained a declaration of policy showing its
purpose was to preserve the highways, promote the safety
of the travelling public, and to adjust and correlate the various transportation agencies of the state in the interests of
the public.
The statute was held valid in the District Court 25 on
the broad ground that the business of the contract motor
carrier was a business affected with a public interest, the
Court emphasizing, the special privileges of using the highways for profit. When the case came before the Supreme
Court", the District Court was affirmed but an entirely different approach was taken. The court first expressly put
aside the question as to whether the contract motor carrier
was a business affected with a public interest and confined
its decision solely to the question whether the statute could
be sustained as a regulation of the use of the highways.
After deciding there was no attempt here, expressly, or in
effect, to convert a private carrier into a common carrier,"
and thus, (to the court's satisfaction) disposing of the
Duke, Frost, and Cahoon cases, the court proceeded to consider whether the permit and rate fixing provisions were
means to the legitimate end of conserving the highways.
The court upheld the permit requirement as a highway
regulation, saying that it was a means to the end of preserving the highways because it would divert carriage from
the highways to the railroads and correspondingly relieve
the latter from burdensome traffic. If the commission, in
24

The court refused to pass upon the requirement that all motor
freight carriers must furnish a bond and insurance to cover loss or injuries to property arising out of the operation of the common carrier.
Z5Stephenson v. Binford, 53 Fed. (2nd) 509, (S. D. Tex. 1931).
26Supra, Note 11.
27"It is true that the regulation imposed upon the two classes are
in some instances similar, if not identical: but they are imposed upon
each class considered by itself, and it does not follow that regulations
appropriately imposed upon the business of a common carrier may not
also be appropriate to the business of a contract carrier". Supra, Note
11, at 185; and see Note 22 Supra.
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refusing a permit, was to base its refusal upon considerations of traffic congestion one would agree with this holding, but it is submitted that since the Commission was to
base its refusal upon the question as to whether there were
already common carriers serving the field (the same test
applied in the case of certificates of public convenience), it
was primarily and substantially an economic measure, regulating the business of the contract carrier and not the use
of his property on the highways. Further, the preservation of the highways is not accomplished by reducing the
number of companies or persons engaged in motor transportation, for a company will increase its facilities as business increases. The only effective method of regulating
the use of the highways is by regulation of the kind of
facilities and the manner of using them.2 8 That some type
of certification would be permissible was implicit in the
opinion in the Frost case, and Justice Holmes, in his dissent
in that case, 29 stated that you could regard as a highway
regulation a permit requirement; but the permit there referred to was one limiting the number and kinds of facilities
rather than one limiting the number engaged in the business and aimed at curbing destructive competition, as in the
Texas statute.
The court had a little more difficulty with respect to
the rate fixing provision but this too was upheld as a regulation for the preservation of the highways upon the same
ground, viz., that it tended to divert traffic from the highways to the railroad. Though it clearly interfered with the
freedom of the parties to contract the court disposed of this
objection by saying that these contracts contemplate the
use of the highways and since the state can regulate the use
it can regulate contracts in so far as they relate to the use.
This theory as to the purpose of rate fixing is a departure
from the previous holdings of the Supreme Court. The
power of a state to fix rates has always been justified on the
ground that the business regulated was affected with a
28See Note 80 U. of P. La*7 Rev. 1008, 1013 (1932).
29Supra, Note 9, 271 U. S. 583 at 592.
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public interest and hence that the business itself could be
regulated.3° Fixing the rates of common carriers has been
recognized as a regulation of the business itself -as
economic legislation aimed at restriction of destructive
competition, and it is difficult to see why the same type of
regulation when applied to a contract motor carrier loses
its aspect of business regulation and becomes a measure to
preserve the highway and protect the life and limb of the
people.
One cannot quarrel with the result of the decision.
The Texas statute was a sound and much needed economic
regulation; but it is felt that if the court had recognized the
statute to be economic legislation aimed at the business of
carriage itself, and upheld it on that ground, the decision
would have been less violative of logic and precedent and
would have served as a better guide in determining the extent to which such regulation may go. Since the court refused to decide whether the contract motor carrier was in
a business affected with a public interest that question is
still open, though it would seem the court doubted its status
as such, or it -would not have indulged in a form of legal
apologetics in sustaining it, by specious reasoning, as a
highway preservation measure.
It would seem that the legislation could be upheld on
the public interest theory. True, if the contract carrier is
segregated and considered apart from other carriers it savors
of a private enterprise. But why not consider it as it is,
an integral and inseparable part of the whole transportation
system, which system, as a whole, is vital to the public welfare? Then we would be on solid ground and the test of
affectation with a public interest would be satisfied. Perhaps this approach is not so much the traditional application of the public interest concept as it is the pragmatic,
wholly sensible approach to the problem advocated by
Justices Stone and Holmes in their dissents in Tyson v. Ban80Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1877); German Alliance Insurance
Co. v. Lewis. 233 U. S. 389 (1914).
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ton and Ribniktv. McBride8 and by Justice Brandeis in his
dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann.3 2 Their theory
would ignore the distinction between regulation of the use
of property and the regulation of the business itself," and
deal with all cases of statutory regulation as involving the
one general police power of the state. By that test the
Texas act would be upheld simply because its purpose was
to prevent unrestricted competition where that competition
was harmful to the general public. The state can prevent
one public utility from entering the field in competition with
a utility already adequately serving the same territory, because such restriction on competition best serves the public
interest. Is not the public interest just as vitally affected
where one not strictly a public utility (when considered by
itself) enters into destructive competition with a utility adequately serving the territory? That being so, why cannot
the state require a certificate or permit from such person
3
before going into business? '
It would also seem that the legislation could be upheld
3

'Tyson & Brothers v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 71 L. Ed. 718 (1927);
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 72 L. Ed. 913 (1928).
8252 S. Ct. 371, P. U. R. 1932B, 433 (1932).
33

The theory that rate regulation stands on a different footing than
regulation of the manner of carrying on a business, and requires a different or special degree of public interest, was really never suggested
until the case of Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262
U. S. 522, P. U. R. 1923D, 746 (1923). For a criticism of this distinction see Finkelstein, "From Munn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton." 27
Col. L. R. 769, 779, (1927).
34An argument along this line has been advanced to support the
proposition that the Commission can require a certificate of public convenience before doing business from a company which supplies water
to one or several contract customers for profit, to the injury of a public
utility water plant serving the same community. If it is held that the
Public Service Company law intends to include such a business within
the regulatory powers of the Commission (and such seems a reasonable
construction) it would seem to be constitutional, on the above reasoning. A decision on this question should be forthcoming in Pennsylvania,
in the case of Borough of Ambridge v. A. M. Byers Co., P. S. C. Docket
No. 9058 (1931), recently argued before the Superior Court.
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on the ground of "special privilege."35 The court's application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in the
Frost Case s " would seem to eliminate the special privilege
argument. However a different approach is possible. The
courts have consistently held that where the state has
granted a special privilege, such as the right of eminent
domain or monopoly, or where a franchise to use streets
for equipment has been given, the receiver is under a correlative obligation to be regulated by the public in respect
to the user of that privilege,"
Why is the same theory not
applicable to a carrier which is given the special privilege
by the state to use its highways for the purpose of gain?"'
The principal case is a landmark in the field of economic legislation and serves as a solution (in part at least)
of one of the most pressing and perplexing economic problems of the day. On its facts it sustains the right of a state
to require a permit (actually no different than the certificate
of public convenience, except for the obligation to serve all
inherent in the latter) and to fix minimum rates with respect
to the contract motor carrier; provided such regulation is

separated from regulation of the common carrier. Further
it displays a liberal attitude on the part of the court in sustaining experimental economic legislation 9 The question
arises as to how much further, or in what other manner, the
contract carrier can be regulated. It would seem that if
regulation must be purposed on the preservation of the
"SSee note 17 supra. The court used identical language in Stephenson v. Binford, 53 S. Ct., 181, at 184.
36See note 18 supra.
37In the Wolff case, supra note 33. Chief Justice Taft placed such
businesses in the first of the three classes of businesses which could be
regulated.
"aThis test is suggested in 31 Mich. L. R. 395, 401 (1933).
9
3 It is interesting to observe that the attitude of judicial conservatism noticeable under the regime of Taft, C. J., as illustrated by his opinionr in the Wolff case, supra note 33, and by Sutherland J. in Ribnik v.
McBride and Tyson v. Banton, supra note 31, seems to have given way
to a more liberal and pragmatic attitude wtih the recent changes in the
personnel of the Supreme Court. For example note the personnel of the
majority and minority opinions in the Tyson and Ribnik cases as compared wth O'Gorman v. Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931).
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highways, as in the principal case, its extent must be more
limited than if sustained on the broader theories above suggested. For example, can a requirement that a contract
carrier furnish a bond and insurance to cover injuries to
goods in transit be sustained as a provision for the preservation of the highways?"0 The aura of uncertainty still
hovers over contract carrier legislation and any further or
novel method of regulation will have to run the gauntlet
until the Supreme Court makes a more definite pronouncement delineating the penumbra of valid regulation.
F. E. Reader.

SOME PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE
DOCTRINE OF LACHES IN EQUITY
IN PENNSYLVANIA
"Vigilanibus, non dormientibus subveniunt leges"
("Equity serves the vigilant, and not those who sleep upon
their rights"). It was said by Lord Cadman in a famous
English case, "A court of equity has always refused its aid
to stale demands, where the party has slept upon his rights,
and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can
call forth this court into activity but conscience, good faith
and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting the
court is passive and does nothing. Laches and neglect are
always discountenanced and therefore, from the beginning
40

The causal connection between compulsory insurance and preservation of the highways is probably no more remote than the fixing of
rates. Any regulation of a contract carrier could conceivably tend to
discourage his entry into the business and thus divert traffic from the
highways. Carried to its ultimate conclusion the doctrine would seem
to permit a requirement that the contract motor carrier must serve all.
Yet the rule of the Duke and Frost cases plainly forbids that, for that
would be converting a private carrier into a common carrier. Somewhere between the regulations of the Texas statute and complete commission control, the line must be drawn.
13 Bro. C. C. 640.

